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INTRODUCTION 
On January 19, 2012, the Department of Justice charged seven 
individuals and two corporations with organizing an international criminal 
enterprise through the website Megaupload.com.1  Pursuant to these 
charges, at the U.S. Government’s request, New Zealand law enforcement 
officials arrested Megaupload founder and CEO Kim Dotcom at his home.2  
The police raid on Dotcom’s home involved over 70 officers armed with 
M-4 automatic rifles and body armor.3  Dotcom and Megaupload were not 
charged with any violent crime, but with “engaging in a racketeering 
conspiracy, conspiring to commit copyright infringement, conspiring to 
commit money laundering, and two substantive counts of criminal 
copyright infringement.”4  The file-sharing site claimed that it complied 
with the law by obeying “notice and takedown” procedures in accordance 
with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe harbor whenever 
rights-holders notified it of infringing material posted on the site.5  Despite 
its compliance with these takedown requests, Megaupload.com was one of 
the most visited sites in the world.6  The source of the site’s popularity was 
its reputation for permitting the posting of copyrighted materials.7 
The Justice Department executed a number of arrest warrants, as well 
as twenty search warrants, in the United States and eight other countries.8  
During the raid on Dotcom’s home, the Megaupload servers were shut 
down.9  As a part of this action, the Justice Department seized $50 million 
 
1 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Charges Leaders of Megaupload 
with Widespread Online Copyright Infringement (Jan. 19, 2012), http://goo.gl/F3ZjXf. 
2 Greg Sandoval, Guns, Body Armor, and Raids: The Piracy Fight Gets Dangerous, 
CNET (Feb. 6, 2012), http://goo.gl/czWdOs. 
3 Id. 
4 Press Release, supra note 1. 
5 The DMCA is a 1998 federal law that amended U.S. copyright statutes, inter alia, to 
create vicarious liability for those who facilitate the posting of infringing material on the 
internet.  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2006)).  It also established a safe 
harbor for alleged infringers: if they remove allegedly infringing materials upon request by 
the copyright-holder, they can immunize themselves from suit.  See generally Edward Lee, 
Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233 (2009) (discussing the 
efficacy of the DCMA safe harbors and when an Internet service provider (ISP) has a duty to 
remove infringing material, along with providing guidance to the courts and Congress for 
future amendments to the DMCA and its current interpretation).  
6 Timothy B. Lee, Civil Asset Forfeiture and Intellectual Property, CATO UNBOUND 
(Jan. 9, 2013), http://goo.gl/ZJU2uB; see also Press Release, supra note 1. 
7 Press Release, supra note 1. 
8 Id. 
9 Timothy B. Lee, How the Criminalization of Copyright Threatens Innovation and the Rule 
of Law, in COPYRIGHT UNBALANCED: FROM INCENTIVE TO EXCESS 55, 65 (Jerry Brito ed., 2012). 
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in assets and completely removed them from the defendant’s control.10  
Federal prosecutors subsequently objected to unfreezing a portion of these 
funds so that the defendant could hire attorneys.11  The cumulative result of 
prosecutors’ actions was clear: “[Kim Dotcom’s] business has been 
effectively destroyed before he sets foot inside a courtroom.”12 
Of particular concern in this ordeal was that providing 
Megaupload.com a legal defense would require settling unresolved and 
complicated copyright questions—certainly ones that would demand the 
services of experienced copyright attorneys.13  Whether a party can be held 
criminally liable for inducing third parties to infringe copyright—known as 
secondary infringement—was central to the matter.14  Although the 
Supreme Court has established that secondary copyright infringement gives 
rise to civil liability,15 the Court has not yet extended this doctrine to 
criminal liability.16  Because the Government’s case was on such shaky 
ground, it was clear from the beginning that the quality of Megaupload’s 
legal counsel would be outcome-determinative.17  Aside from these novel 
questions of law, the facts of the case are “hugely complex” and involve 
petabytes of data.18 
 
10 Nate Anderson, Why the Feds Smashed Megaupload, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 19, 2012), 
http://goo.gl/eS6kHS; see also Indictment at 66–71, United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12-CR-3 
(E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012) (listing all the defendants’ assets subject to forfeiture). 
11 [Proposed] Motion to Challenge the Scope of Pretrial Restraint of Assets of Defendants 
Megaupload Limited, Kim Dotcom, Mathias Ortmann, Bram Van Der Kolk & Finn Batato and 
Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof at 4, United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12-CR-3 (E.D. 
Va. May 30, 2012) [hereinafter Defendants’ Motion to Challenge the Scope] (“[T]he 
Government has also deprived Megaupload of its right to counsel by freezing all of its 
worldwide assets, then refusing to agree to unfreeze one penny to fund defense efforts. . . .”).  
12 Lee, supra note 9, at 67.  
13 Timothy B. Lee, Government Trying to Deny Megaupload Fair Legal Representation, 
ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 15, 2012), http://goo.gl/xRJ0WP. 
14 Jennifer Granick, Megaupload: A Lot Less Guilty than You Think, CTR. FOR INTERNET 
AND SOC’Y (Jan. 26, 2012, 11:47 AM), http://goo.gl/Woqjfi. 
15 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005) 
(“[T]he inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright.  We adopt it here, holding that 
one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as 
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable 
for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”). 
16 See Granick, supra note 14. 
17 Id. (“[P]rosecuting this case against Mega, especially if Defendants get good criminal 
lawyers who also understand copyright law, is going to be an uphill battle for the government.”). 
18 Defendants’ Motion to Challenge the Scope, supra note 11, at 2.  A single petabyte is a 
truly enormous amount of data, capable of storing 500 billion pages of printed text.  Megabytes, 
Gigabytes, Terabytes . . . What Are They?, WHAT’S A BYTE?, http://goo.gl/oJrpbn (last visited 
Dec. 28, 2013). 
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Without the frozen $50 million in assets, the company and the 
individuals indicted would be unable to afford a legal defense.19  Given the 
novel questions of law involved, it is counter to the public interest (and 
most certainly counter to Megaupload’s interests) to have such an 
enormously complicated case be resolved by overworked and underpaid 
public defenders.20  More bizarre is the idea that public defenders’ already 
scarce resources should be redirected from indigent defendants to a 
defendant who has the means to pay for his own legal defense—that the 
Government should impose indigence upon Megaupload. 
The law firm Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan sought to represent 
Megaupload in the criminal trial.21  The attorneys argued that “[i]f the 
Government is to have its way, the only evidence available to the Court 
would be that [evidence] cherry-picked by the Government . . . .  
Megaupload will never get its day in Court and the case will effectively be 
over before it has even begun.”22  Megaupload’s prospective attorneys 
further argued that the Government’s imposition of secondary criminal 
liability was unprecedented and unlikely to succeed.23  Still, the 
Government was able to successfully freeze Megaupload’s assets.24 
The Megaupload case illustrates the burgeoning use of forfeiture law 
in the United States.  In the 1970s, Congress passed as parts of other 
legislation the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
 
19 Id at 12–13. 
By the Government’s design, all available assets for the defense have been seized and frozen, as the 
Government well knows.  The limited allotments Mr. Dotcom is receiving (by order of a New 
Zealand court) are reserved for his living expenses and those of his family and cannot be used to 
cover legal expenses, as is already a matter of record before this Court.  All of the legal work 
performed to date by the undersigned has gone without recompense.  The Government has effectively 
acknowledged the Defendants’ inability to pay for attorneys in proposing release of frozen funds for 
the narrow purpose of preserving servers.  For present purposes, therefore, there should be no dispute 
that Defendants are in fact unable to fund their defense absent the requested relief. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
20 See Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2156 (2013) (“[T]he lawyer assigned to defend 
a poor person usually has little or no time and few resources to investigate the charges and 
mount a defense.”). 
21 Lee, supra note 13. 
22 Rebuttal Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Motion of Quinn Emanuel 
Urquhart & Sullivan LLP and the Rothken Law Firm for Leave to Enter Limited Appearance 
on Behalf of Megaupload Limited and Kim Dotcom at 1, United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12-
CR-3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2012). 
23 Id. at 16. 
24 Timothy B. Lee, Asset Forfeiture Abuse Threatens Fair Trial in Copyright Case, 
CATO INST. (April 16, 2012, 8:26 AM), http://goo.gl/ScGyEi.  
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(RICO)25 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) statute,26 which 
both include criminal asset forfeiture provisions.27  In order to bolster the 
effectiveness of these forfeiture provisions, Congress later passed the 
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act (CFA).28  As a result of the CFA, the Justice 
Department was granted the power to seize forfeitable assets before trial, so 
long as there was “probable cause to believe that the property is subject to 
forfeiture.”29  The statute itself provides for no adversarial hearing, pre- or 
post-restraint, to determine the propriety of the asset seizure.30 
While these forfeiture statutes were originally aimed at organized 
crime and the drug trade, the Megaupload case shows that the use of the 
tool has expanded.  As time has gone by, more and more offenses have 
become forfeitable.31  The forfeiture device itself was originally expanded 
to combat the perception that organized crime was profitable.32  Today, it is 
used indiscriminately and in a way that deprives defendants of a meaningful 
legal defense. 
Another critical element of this problem is financial.  In 1986, the 
second year after the creation of the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture 
Fund, the Fund received $93.7 million.33  In 2008, the Asset Forfeiture 
 
25 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922, 941–
48 (codified as amended as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 
U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012)). 
26 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408, 
84 Stat. 1236, 1265 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (2006 & Supp. 2009)). 
27 18 U.S.C. § 1963(b); 21 U.S.C. § 848(a); see also Max M. Nelson, Note, Federal 
Forfeiture and Money Laundering: Undue Deference to Legal Fictions and the Canadian 
Crossroads, 41 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 43, 47–50 (2009). 
28 18 U.S.C. § 981; Nelson, supra note 27, at 48–49. 
29 18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2)(B).  
30 United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 2012). 
31 See Nelson, supra note 27, at 49–50.  Originally applied to RICO cases, Congress 
expanded forfeiture to apply to money laundering and then any property “involved in” 
money laundering. 
32 See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 191 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374.  
Title III of the bill (Sections 301-323) is designed to enhance the use of forfeiture, and in 
particular, the sanction of criminal forfeiture, as a law enforcement tool in combatting two of the 
most serious crimes facing the country: racketeering and drug trafficking.  Profit is the 
motivation for this criminal activity, and it is through economic power that it is sustained and 
grows.  More than ten years ago, the Congress recognized in its enactment of statutes specifically 
addressing organized crime and illegal drugs that the conviction of individual racketeers and 
drug dealers would be of only limited effectiveness if the economic power bases of criminal 
organizations or enterprises were left intact, and so included forfeiture authority designed to strip 
these offenders and organizations of their economic power. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
33 MARIAN R. WILLIAMS ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF 
CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 11 (2010). 
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Fund exceeded $1 billion in net assets.34  This Comment demonstrates that 
financial incentives for investigating and prosecuting forfeitable offenses 
have the utterly predictable effect of increasing said investigations and 
prosecutions.35 
Part I of this Comment discusses the Supreme Court’s firm rejection of 
an exception to the CFA for the payment of attorney’s fees,36 although the 
Court left open the possibility of courts using a pretrial procedure to help 
protect defendants from improper forfeiture.37  Part II discusses the two 
main approaches the circuit courts take in formulating a pretrial procedure 
for determining the propriety of a forfeiture action.  The D.C. and Second 
Circuits have taken the view that these hearings should encompass the 
questions of (1) whether the forfeitable assets are rightly traceable to illegal 
activity and (2) whether the government can prove that there is probable 
cause that an offense took place.38  In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit has held 
that such a hearing can only address the former.39  Part III introduces 
evidence and argument questioning the assumptions made by the Eleventh 
Circuit in denying defendants a full pretrial hearing.40  Part IV then argues 
that the D.C. and Second Circuits’ approach more adequately protects the 
serious interests involved in pretrial restraint of assets and that the 
increasing problem of the overuse of federal forfeiture statutes should be of 
paramount importance in these matters.  On those grounds, Part IV argues 
that the Supreme Court should adopt the D.C. and Second Circuit’s 
approach in Kaley v. United States. 
I. ATTORNEY’S FEE FORFEITURE IN THE LATE 1980S 
In 1989 companion decisions, the Supreme Court took up the question 
of whether a criminal defendant has the right to use forfeitable assets to pay 
attorney’s fees.41  In Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, the 
 
34 Id. 
35 None of the foregoing is intended to disparage law enforcement officials or 
prosecutors.  To the contrary, it simply proves that they are subject to the same incentives as 
anybody else.  The problem lies not with those carrying out the forfeiture but rather the 
incentive structure created by current forfeiture law. 
36 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 632 (1989) (“We 
therefore reject petitioner’s claim of a Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to use 
assets that are the Government’s—assets adjudged forfeitable, as Reckmeyer’s were—to pay 
attorney’s fees . . . .”). 
37 United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto III), 491 U.S. 600, 615 n.10 (1989).  
38 See United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411, 417, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Monsanto (Monsanto IV), 924 F.2d 1186, 1196, 1203 (2d Cir. 1991). 
39 See United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1317 (11th Cir. 2012). 
40 Id. 
41 See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 619 (5–4 decision); Monsanto III, 491 U.S. at 602. 
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defendant, Christopher Reckmeyer, had been indicted for importing and 
distributing illegal narcotics.42  The indictment charged that Reckmeyer’s 
activities constituted a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of federal 
law.43  Pursuant to federal criminal forfeiture law,44 the indictment 
authorized forfeiture of a range of Reckmeyer’s assets.45  Subsequently, the 
district court issued a restraining order freezing his potentially forfeitable 
assets.46 
By the time Reckmeyer was indicted, he had already retained an 
attorney, who subsequently moved for permission to use restrained assets 
for legal fees and to exempt his fees from postconviction forfeiture.47  
Unfortunately for Reckmeyer’s attorney, Reckmeyer reached a plea 
agreement with the prosecutor before the question of the forfeitability of his 
fees could be resolved—Reckmeyer’s assets were forfeited as a part of the 
agreement.48 
Reckmeyer’s attorney, the petitioner in Caplin & Drysdale, argued, 
inter alia, that the lack of an exemption for attorney’s fees in the federal 
forfeiture statue impinged upon Reckmeyer’s Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel as well as his Fifth Amendment right to a balance of power 
between the government and the accused.49  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s finding that the forfeiture statute violated Reckmeyer’s right 
to his counsel of choice, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.50  However, 
the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, later reversed the panel decision, finding 
that the lack of an attorney’s fee exception did not violate the Sixth 
Amendment.51  Specifically, the court found that “there is no established 
Sixth Amendment right to pay an attorney with the illicit proceeds of drug 
transactions.”52 
The Supreme Court, upholding the Fourth Circuit’s disposition of 
Caplin & Drysdale, held that neither the Sixth Amendment nor the Fifth 
 
42 Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 619. 
43 Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. V)). 
44 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
45 Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 619–20. 
46 Id. at 620. 
47 Id. at 620–21. 
48 Id. at 621. 
49 Id. at 623–24. 
50 United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 909 (4th Cir. 1987), rev’d en banc, 837 F.2d 
637 (4th Cir. 1988). 
51 In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 640 (4th 
Cir. 1988) (en banc).  
52 Id. 
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Amendment prohibited the forfeiture scheme in question.53  In his majority 
opinion, Justice Byron White was concerned that an attorney’s fee 
exception would permit, for example, a robbery suspect to use stolen funds 
to retain an expensive attorney.54  The majority opinion was built around 
this “bank robber” hypothetical, making several arguments in support.  
First, Justice White suggested that the bank robber in possession of some 
nonforfeitable assets is free to pay an attorney with those assets.55  If a 
defendant lacks the resources to hire an attorney, he is free to rely on 
appointed counsel, but in any case, “[a] defendant may not insist on 
representation by an attorney he cannot afford.”56 
Second, the majority opinion indicated that the federal government has 
a substantial interest in the property rights conveyed by the forfeiture 
statute.57  The Court enumerated three particular government interests in the 
forfeited assets: (1) depositing them into the Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund, 
(2) permitting crime victims to make claims to forfeited assets under the 
statute, and (3) deflating the resources of organized crime.58  In the Court’s 
opinion, these resources “include[] the use of such economic power to 
retain private counsel.”59  Consequently, the Court found that the 
government’s interest in the forfeitable funds overrode the defendant’s 
Sixth Amendment interests.60 
Third, the majority opinion summarily dismissed concerns that the 
lack of an attorney’s fee exception may give rise to prosecutorial abuse, as 
“[e]very criminal law carries with it the potential for abuse.”61  Finally, 
Justice White expressed a concern that a constitutionally mandated 
exception for attorney’s fees would give rise to additional exceptions to 
fund other constitutional rights.62  Underscoring the majority’s hostility to 
the application of a qualified right to counsel of choice, Justice White 
echoed the appellate court’s conclusion that “[t]he modern day Jean Valjean 
 
53 Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 617. 
54 Id. at 626. 
55 Id. at 625.  
56 Id. at 624 (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)). 
57 Id. at 627 (“In § 853(c), the so-called relation-back provision, Congress dictated that 
[a]ll right, title and interest in property obtained by criminals via the illicit means described 
in the statute vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to 
forfeiture.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 
58 Id. at 629–30. 
59 Id. at 630. 
60 Id. at 631. 
61 Id. at 634 (quoting In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 
F.2d 637, 648 (4th Cir. 1988)). 
62 Id. at 628 (“If defendants have a right to spend forfeitable assets on attorney’s fees, 
why not on exercises of the right to speak, practice one’s religion, or travel?”). 
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must be satisfied with appointed counsel.  Yet the drug merchant claims 
that his possession of huge sums of money . . . entitles him to something 
more.  We reject this contention. . . .”63 
In Caplin & Drysdale’s companion case, United States v. Monsanto 
(Monsanto III), the Supreme Court heard an appeal from the Second 
Circuit.  Sitting en banc, the Second Circuit had ruled that a restraining 
order freezing the defendant’s assets be modified to allow the defendant to 
pay “legitimate (that is, non-sham) attorney’s fees.”64  The court further 
ruled that fees paid to the defendant’s attorney would not be forfeitable in 
the event of conviction.65 
However, in Monsanto III, the Supreme Court reversed the Second 
Circuit’s decision.66  The Monsanto III defendant argued that the forfeiture 
statute, as applied, violated his qualified right to counsel of choice 
established in the Sixth Amendment as well as his Fifth Amendment right 
to a “balance of forces” between the defense and the prosecution.67  The 
majority opinion, also written by Justice White, applied the holding in 
Caplin & Drysdale and ruled that the freezing of assets needed to buy a 
legal defense offended neither of those rights.68  The companion decisions 
Monsanto III and Caplin & Drysdale therefore firmly established that 
criminal forfeiture laws permit restraining funds that a defendant wishes to 
use for legal representation. 
II. POST-1989 FEDERAL APPELLATE DEVELOPMENTS 
After its disposition in the Supreme Court in 1989 as Monsanto III, the 
Supreme Court remanded the case, and it was ultimately reheard by the 
Second Circuit.69  In deciding Monsanto III, the Supreme Court left the 
lower courts to determine a procedural matter: whether a pretrial restraining 
order freezing a defendant’s assets should require some sort of hearing.70  
When the case returned to the Second Circuit as Monsanto IV, the court 
ruled that a pretrial adversarial ruling was necessary to freeze the 
 
63 Id. at 630 (quoting In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 
F.2d at 649). 
64 United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto II), 852 F.2d 1400, 1402 (2d Cir. 1988) (per 
curiam), rev’d, 491 U.S. 600 (1989). 
65 Id. 
66 Monsanto III, 491 U.S. 600, 616 (1989).  
67 Id. at 614. 
68 Id. 
69 Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d 1186, 1191 (2d Cir. 1991). 
70 Monsanto III, 491 U.S. at 615 & n.10 (“We do not consider today, however, whether the 
Due Process Clause requires a hearing before a pretrial restraining order can be imposed.”). 
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defendant’s assets.71  The D.C. Circuit in United States v. E-Gold, Ltd. 
conformed to Monsanto IV and held that due process requires a pretrial 
adversarial hearing on the probable cause of the underlying indictment 
where asset access is necessary to hire an attorney.72 
In United States v. Kaley, however, the Eleventh Circuit created a 
circuit split by ruling that defendants subject to forfeiture may not challenge 
the evidentiary support for the charges against them before trial.73  Instead, 
a defendant in a pretrial forfeiture hearing in the Eleventh Circuit would 
only be permitted to challenge the “traceability” of the frozen assets to the 
forfeiture offense and not the viability of the underlying claim.74  This Part 
discusses these developments in more detail. 
A. MONSANTO IV 
On remand, the Second Circuit concluded that due process 
necessitated a hearing before a pretrial restraining order could be put in 
place, and the court indicated the form of the hearing: 
We conclude that (1) the fifth and sixth amendments, considered in combination, 
require an adversary, post-restraint, pretrial hearing as to probable cause that (a) the 
defendant committed crimes that provide a basis for forfeiture, and (b) the properties 
specified as forfeitable in the indictment are properly forfeitable, to continue a 
restraint of assets (i) needed to retain counsel of choice and (ii) ordered ex parte 
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A)(1988); (2) consistent with 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(3) 
(1988), the court may receive and consider at such a hearing evidence and information 
that would be inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence; and (3) grand jury 
determinations of probable cause may be reconsidered in such a hearing.75 
In deciding that a hearing was necessary, the Second Circuit found 
particularly important that a defendant denied an opportunity to contest the 
restraint of assets is effectively deprived of hired counsel.76 
The Government agreed that due process requires a pretrial hearing 
during oral argument; however, the Government disagreed with the Second 
Circuit’s determination of what the hearing must include.77  Specifically, 
the Government wished to allow the defendant to question the grand jury’s 
determination of which assets were forfeitable without questioning the 
determination of probable cause that the defendant committed an offense.78  
 
71 Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d at 1191. 
72 United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
73 United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1330 (11th Cir. 2012). 
74 Id. at 1317. 
75 Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d at 1203. 
76 Id. at 1195. 
77 Id. at 1196. 
78 Id. 
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However, the Second Circuit concluded that, while the legislative history 
was skeptical of pre-restraint hearings,79 it had little to say regarding the 
possibility of holding a post-restraint hearing to continue the restraining 
order until trial.80 
Giving further form to this adversarial, post-restraint, pretrial hearing, 
the court sought to limit the burden it placed on prosecutors.81  Specifically, 
the court indicated that the Federal Rules of Evidence would not be 
followed in these hearings thus permitting hearsay testimony.82  This 
modification catered to the Government’s concern that a pretrial procedure 
would impose an undue burden on prosecutors.83  The court further pointed 
out that prosecutors are always free to forego restraining assets pretrial to 
protect their cases; post-trial forfeiture is still a viable option.84 
B. UNITED STATES V. E-GOLD, LTD. 
In another asset forfeiture case, the D.C. Circuit issued a ruling similar 
to the Second Circuit in Monsanto IV.85  The E-Gold court agreed with 
Monsanto IV’s conclusion that, because criminal defendants subject to asset 
forfeiture may attempt to hide their assets, a pre-restraint hearing is simply 
not possible.86  In determining the necessity of a post-restraint, pretrial 
hearing, the court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge test, which is used to 
determine whether an individual’s due process rights have been violated.87 
The Mathews test involves a three-step analysis to determine: (1) the 
private interests that are affected, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of 
those interests and whether adequate safeguards can be imposed, and (3) the 
government’s interests.88  Weighing these factors, the court first determined 
the private interest affected by whether a pretrial hearing occurs.89  In this 
regard, the court found that private interests weighed particularly heavily, 
affecting not only a defendant’s ability to dispose of his property as he 
 
79 Id. at 1199; S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 196 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3379.  
80 Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d at 1199. 
81 Id. at 1198. 
82 Id. 
83 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 196 (“[T]hese requirements may make pursuing a restraining 
order inadvisable from the prosecutor’s point of view because of the potential for damaging 
premature disclosure of the government’s case and trial strategy and for jeopardizing the 
safety of witnesses . . . .”). 
84 Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d at 1208. 
85 United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411, 416–19 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
86 Id. at 416–17. 
87 Id. at 417; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
88 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
89 E-Gold, 521 F.3d at 417. 
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pleases but also a defendant’s qualified Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.90  This finding led the court to conclude that the first Mathews 
factor pointed decisively toward holding a hearing.91 
In weighing the second factor, the court determined that forfeiture 
involved a high risk of erroneous deprivation.92  The court pointed out that a 
judge issued the original seizure warrant following an ex parte proceeding,93 
and the court further explained that an adversarial hearing could bring to 
light new evidence that makes restraint unnecessary or unwarranted.  An ex 
parte proceeding is unlikely to produce opposing viewpoints.94  
Additionally, a hearing would fulfill a “fundamental requirement of due 
process[,] . . . the opportunity to be heard.”95 
Finally, the court weighed the government’s interests to complete the 
Mathews analysis.96  In weighing the government’s interests, the court did 
not find sufficient reason to set aside the defendant’s due process rights.97  
Similar to the Monsanto IV court, the E-Gold court found that the “invasion 
of grand jury secrecy” could be avoided by holding in camera hearings and 
relaxing the applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence.98 
C. UNITED STATES V. KALEY 
In United States v. Kaley, the defendants were dissimilar from the 
defendants in Monsanto or Caplin & Drysdale; unlike the forfeiture 
defendants of the 1980s, the Kaleys were not accused of trafficking illegal 
narcotics.  Instead, the defendants were a married couple accused of 
stealing prescription medical devices99 from hospitals and selling them 
across state lines.100  The Kaleys were handed a seven-count indictment, 
alleging, inter alia, that they had engaged in a conspiracy to transport 
prescription medical devices that they knew to be stolen.101  The indictment 
also listed forfeitable assets to be frozen, including a certificate of deposit 
 
90 Id. 




95 Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 
96 Id. at 418–19. 
97 Id. at 419. 
98 Id. 
99 Prescription medical devices (PMDs) are FDA-regulated objects that run the gamut 
from artificial hearts to sutures to tongue depressors.  Does FDA Regulate Medical Devices?, 
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://goo.gl/yLlFrm (last visited Dec. 19, 2013). 
100 United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012). 
101 Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012). 
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that the Kaleys had purchased with the proceeds of a home equity line of 
credit.102 
In the district court, the Kaleys moved to vacate the asset-freezing 
restraining order that was issued as a result of the indictment.103  The 
magistrate judge found probable cause that the Kaleys’ residence and the 
certificate of deposit were “involved in” the violations of law and therefore 
ordered that those assets be restrained.104  On appeal, the D.C. Circuit 
reversed the district court’s denial of a pretrial evidentiary hearing and 
remanded the case to the district court.105 
In the pretrial hearing, the Kaleys challenged the Government’s theory 
of the case, arguing that the facts could not support the charges.106  In 
denying the motion to vacate the asset freeze, the district court reportedly 
held that “the only relevant inquiry at the hearing was whether the 
restrained assets were traceable to or involved in the alleged criminal 
conduct.”107 
In its ruling, the Eleventh Circuit acted, at least partially, out of 
concern that allowing a full evidentiary hearing on the merits of the case 
would impermissibly set aside the grand jury’s probable cause 
determination.108  The court emphasized the grand jury’s independence and 
the fact that it is not a part of the prosecutorial arm.109  Along these lines, 
the court pointed out that defendants get a modicum of due process, because 
the prosecution must obtain a court order to freeze assets after the grand 
jury’s indictment.110 
The Kaley decision reflects an overarching judicial desire to avoid 
giving criminal defendants another route to delay their trials: “[A] 
defendant whose assets have been restrained will ultimately receive a 
thorough hearing—the trial itself—that goes to the merits of the underlying 
charge. . . . The question is simply whether the Due Process Clause requires 
that the defendant get two such hearings.”111  As further justification, the 
court expressed its enthusiasm for criminal forfeiture’s objective of 
 
102 Kaley, 677 F.3d at 1318. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 1318–19. 
105 Id. at 1319. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 1320. 
108 Id. at 1323 (“[T]he Court has shown a profound reluctance to allow pretrial 
challenges to a grand jury’s probable cause determination.”). 
109 Id. at 1325. 
110 Id. at 1327. 
111 Id. 
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removing the incentives for crime.112  Although this is a worthy objective, 
this Comment argues that the consequences of forfeiture’s current 
implementation outweigh the need to disincentivize crime.  The Monsanto 
IV and E-Gold decisions were correct in moving toward more protections 
for defendants, while Kaley was unforgiving in its strict applications of 
Monsanto III and Caplin & Drysdale, doing serious damage to the Sixth 
Amendment. 
III. FLAWS UNDERPINNING MONSANTO III AND CAPLIN & DRYSDALE 
Monsanto III and Caplin & Drysdale were decided before the 
explosion of forfeiture proceedings.113  This fact alone means that the courts 
deciding subsequent cases should account for the change in environment.  
But aside from the increased amount of forfeitures, the Supreme Court 
failed to anticipate the effects these decisions would have on the defense 
bar.  Further, the Court decided Monsanto III and Caplin & Drysdale under 
the influence of an analogy that reverberates through the subsequent case 
law114: the question-begging proposition that forfeiture defendants are the 
same as bank robbers caught red-handed and can be presumed guilty for the 
purposes of forfeiture proceedings. 
A. THE “EXPLOSION” OF FORFEITURE 
In Caplin & Drysdale, the Supreme Court dismissed out of hand the 
defendant’s concerns about abusive forfeiture practices.115  In light of recent 
evidence regarding the use of forfeiture statutes (both civil and criminal), 
this flippant attitude should be reconsidered.  In the 1980s, after the passage 
of the CFA, federal use of the forfeiture power “exploded.”116  Prior to the 
CFA, authorities deposited forfeiture proceeds into general government 
funds.117  However, the CFA amended the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and 
 
112 Id. at 1329. 
113 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 33, at 32 tbl.7.  Much of the growth of forfeiture has 
occurred since 2000 with the Asset Forfeiture Fund doubling in size between 2000 and 2008 
from $536,500,000 to $1,000,700,000.  Id.  
114 See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) (“A 
robbery suspect, for example, has no Sixth Amendment right to use funds he has stolen from a 
bank to retain an attorney to defend him if he is apprehended.”); Monsanto III, 491 U.S. 600, 
614 (1989) (“We rely on our conclusion in [Caplin & Drysdale] to dispose of the similar 
constitutional claims raised by respondent here.”); United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 
1320–21 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Justice White’s bank robber analogy).  
115 Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 634 (“Petitioner’s claim—that the power available to 
prosecutors under the statute could be abused—proves too much, for many tools available to 
prosecutors can be misused in a way that violates the rights of innocent persons.”). 
116 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 33, at 10. 
117 Id. 
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Prevention Act to establish an Assets Forfeiture Fund, which would receive 
all forfeited funds.118 
The Fund was subsequently opened up to allow law enforcement 
personnel to use the funds to outfit themselves with cars, laboratory 
equipment, communication equipment, and even aircraft.119    More 
disturbingly, funds also became available to pay law enforcement officers’ 
overtime salaries.120  Law enforcement officers thus have individual 
pecuniary interests in which crimes they choose to pursue.  To further 
incentivize forfeitures, the Justice Department began cooperating with local 
law enforcement, offering a cut of the seizures to participating local 
agencies.121  This “equitable sharing” arrangement often operates to 
circumvent state laws prohibiting forfeiture funds from being used by state 
police.122 
If one thing is clear, it is what results from these policies.  Forfeitures 
have increased from $93.7 million in 1986 to a total of net assets in the 
Fund of over $1 billion by 2008.123  Law enforcement’s desire to control 
these funds has created a perverse incentive for prosecutors to arrest for 
forfeiture offenses, and in particular, drug-related crimes.124  In fact, some 
commentators have indicated that the push for the War on Drugs beginning 
in the 1970s is a direct result of the changes made to forfeiture laws.125  
Because forfeiture laws vary by state, it is simple to determine whether 
states with tough forfeiture laws also feature more drug arrests and 
prosecutions.126  A study on this precise question concluded that law 
enforcement officers are far more likely to make drug arrests in 
jurisdictions where police can retain the assets they seize.127  These results 
support the economic theory of bureaucracy, namely that “bureaucrats[’] 
desire increases in discretionary budgets, and that they also have a good 
deal of discretion in deciding how to allocate resources in the short run.  In 
 
118 Id. at 10–11. 
119 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1)(F)(i)–(iii) (2012). 
120 Id. at § 524(c)(1)(I). 
121 Brent D. Mast et al., Entrepreneurial Police and Drug Enforcement Policy, 104 PUB. 
CHOICE 285, 287 (2000). 
122 Id. 
123 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 33, at 11. 
124 Id. 
125 See Mast et al., supra note 121, at 287.  See generally Emily Dufton, The War on 
Drugs: How President Nixon Tied Addiction to Crime, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2012, 12:04 
PM), http://goo.gl/C2DJjY (detailing the inception of the War on Drugs during the Nixon 
Administration). 
126 See Mast, supra note 121, at 301–02. 
127 Id. at 301–03 (“Legislation permitting police to keep a portion of seized assets raises drug 
arrests as a portion of total arrests by about 20 percent and drug arrest rates by about 18 percent.”). 
180 MATTHEW R. LASKY [Vol. 104  
other words, like market entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial bureaucrats will 
respond to relative prices.”128  In the case of forfeitures, the data support the 
theory that police officers and prosecutors have disproportionately pursued 
drug offenders to increase forfeiture funds. 
More concerning, further research indicates that this approach distorts 
drug policy, unduly incentivizing drug interdiction over drug treatment.129  
Finally, a recent survey of law enforcement executives found that nearly 
40% of the police agencies now see forfeiture proceeds as necessary to 
police operations.130  The Justice Department, historically, has even asked 
its attorneys to step up forfeiture proceedings in order to meet budgetary 
targets.131  In Caplin & Drysdale, the Supreme Court saw no cause for 
concern about the abuse of asset forfeiture proceedings.132  One can only 
hope that more contemporary analyses of the issue will give rise to greater 
concern.  The unique issue in asset forfeiture cases of the personal interests 
of law enforcement officers and prosecutors should give the Court reason to 
institute better safeguards for defendants. 
B. SOCIALIZATION OF THE DEFENSE BAR 
Another potential consequence of the rise of criminal forfeiture 
proceedings is the socialization of the criminal defense bar—criminal 
defense attorneys will be increasingly appointed, not hired.  As discussed 
above, asset freezing can often prevent criminal defendants from hiring 
attorneys of their choice.133  As more and more offenses become forfeitable, 
public defenders increasingly become the only options for criminal 
defendants.  However, this is not the only effect that Monsanto III and 
Caplin & Drysdale have on the criminal defense bar. 
In his dissent from Monsanto III and Caplin & Drysdale, Justice Harry 
Blackmun wrote, “Had it been Congress’ express aim to undermine the 
adversary system as we know it, it could hardly have found a better engine 
of destruction than attorney’s-fee forfeiture.”134  Justice Blackmun was 
extremely concerned that attorneys would refuse to take on the defense of 
potential defendants who may be accused of forfeitable crimes.135  
Attorneys would be quite hesitant to take on a client whose fees could be 
 
128 Id. at 303. 
129 Id. 
130 WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 33, at 12. 
131 Id. 
132 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 634 (1989). 
133 Id. at 648 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
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seized after the fact via the “relation-back” component136 of the forfeiture 
statute.137  Beyond the immediate issue of whether an attorney could be 
retained, criminal attorneys would also now be wary of whether their 
unindicted clients’ fees could be forfeitable in the future. 
Further, in Justice Blackmun’s view, private attorneys, “so foolish, 
ignorant, beholden or idealistic as to take the business,” would have serious 
problems representing their clients.138  To establish themselves as bona-fide 
purchasers under the CFA, they would have to remain intentionally ignorant 
of their clients’ potentially or allegedly illegal conduct so as to maintain 
that they were “reasonably without cause to believe that the property was 
subject to forfeiture. . . .”139  Nor would a contingency fee arrangement 
solve these concerns.  After all, such arrangements are a violation of ethical 
norms and are prohibited.140 
Aside from the direct effects on criminal defense attorneys and their 
potential clients, the socialization of the criminal defense bar has 
deleterious effects on the development of the law.  In the prosecution of 
 
136 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (2006 & Supp. 2009) states in relevant part:  
All right, title, and interest in any property described in subsection (a) of this section vests in the 
United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section.  Any 
such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may be the 
subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United 
States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (n) of this section that 
he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of the purchase was 
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section. 
137 Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 648–49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
138 Id. at 649 (quoting United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).  
139 Id. at 655. 
140 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d) (2012) (“A lawyer shall not enter into an 
arrangement for, charge, or collect: . . . (2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a 
criminal case.”); see also Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 649 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
Perhaps the attorney will be willing to violate ethical norms by working on a contingent-fee basis 
in a criminal case.  But if he is not—and we should question the integrity of any criminal-defense 
attorney who would violate the ethical norms of the profession by doing so—the attorney’s own 
interests will dictate that he remain ignorant of the source of the assets from which he is paid. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
Given the ethical rules against contingency fee criminal defenses, any non-pro bono 
defense of a forfeiture defendant could be considered a contingency fee defense.  Even if 
funds are not yet frozen, it is unclear whether the specter of the “relation-back” provision as 
applied to attorneys converts a noncontingency fee legal defense into a contingency fee legal 
defense.  This topic has been neglected as of late, and a reevaluation of the ethical rule 
against these arrangements may be merited.  See generally Lindsey N. Godfrey, Note, 
Rethinking the Ethical Ban on Criminal Contingent Fees: A Commonsense Approach to 
Asset Forfeiture, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1699 (2001) (arguing that, with proper safeguards, 
contingency fee criminal defense can be ethically defensible).  However, this interesting 
discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment.  
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Megaupload, for example, the defendant’s case involved novel issues of 
copyright law, specifically whether there secondary criminal liability can be 
imposed for copyright infringement.  These legal issues will not likely be 
adequately explored by public defenders with little experience with 
copyright law or the time to fully research the issues.  Court-appointed 
attorneys often lack the time and resources to take on complex litigation.141  
It seems counterproductive for a case involving $50 million and the 
development of the broader copyright law to be decided by an attorney with 
little experience in the area.  Even in the RICO and CCE cases to which the 
CFA was originally aimed, “[d]espite the legal profession’s commitment to 
pro bono work, it is doubtful that attorneys would be willing to invest the 
many hours of legal work necessary to defend against these serious 
charges . . . .”142 
C. BANK ROBBERS, THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND THE QUALIFIED 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE 
The Supreme Court has established that, under the Sixth Amendment, 
criminal defendants enjoy the right to counsel of their choosing.143  
However, this right has been qualified in a few key ways.144  For example, 
the Court has ruled that a client cannot choose an attorney who is not a 
member of the bar.145  Additionally, the Court has ruled that a defendant is 
not entitled to counsel that the defendant cannot afford.146 
Pursuant to these limitations, the majority opinion in Caplin & 
Drysdale likened the forfeiture defendant to a bank robber.147  Justice White 
pointed out that a bank robbery suspect, caught with funds stolen from a 
bank, would not be permitted to use those funds to hire an attorney.148  The 
notion that the forfeiture defendant is analogous to a robber caught red-
handed with stolen money underpins the Court’s lack of sympathy for 
forfeiture defendants.149  Like the bank robber, the forfeiture defendant has 
no legal claim over the suspect assets because of the “relation-back” 
 
141 United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1476 (5th Cir. 1986); Bright & Sanneh, supra 
note 20, at 5. 
142 United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1316 (D. Md. 1986). 
143 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (“It is hardly necessary to say that, the 
right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure 
counsel of his own choice.”). 
144 Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 625 (1989). 
148 Id. 
149 See United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1320 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012). 
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provision of the forfeiture statute.150 Justice White further justified this 
analogy by using the rationale of forfeiture laws to deprive organized crime 
of its economic power.151  Justice White’s reasoning is also important to the 
Kaley decision.   
Yet, this analogy is flawed for five reasons.  First, as in Kaley, it is not 
entirely clear which funds are forfeitable and which funds are not.152  
Justice White’s analogy invokes a particular image in the reader’s mind: a 
bank robber on the run, perhaps on the way back from the heist.  His ill-
gotten gains are bank-bags full of cash and gold bullion and are therefore 
conveniently marked for law enforcement confiscation.  The reader knows 
immediately that these bags do not belong to the robber, and that they must 
be returned to the bank.  In contrast, the defendants in Kaley allegedly used 
tainted funds to purchase a home and ultimately obtain a line of credit on 
the home.153  The alleged ill-gotten gains became intermingled with the rest 
of the family’s funds, making it no longer easy to discern the allegedly 
illegitimate and forfeitable funds from the family’s legitimate lifetime 
savings. 
Second, Justice White’s analogy is question-begging.  In establishing 
the hypothetical, he states: “A robbery suspect, for example, has no Sixth 
Amendment right to use funds he has stolen from a bank to retain an 
attorney. . . .”154  Of course, it is not uncontroversial that stolen money 
should be used for the robber’s legal defense.  However, Justice White’s 
example has already declared the defendant guilty by assuming that he has 
stolen property in his possession.  This assumption goes against the 
fundamental doctrine of American criminal law that every defendant “is 
presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”155 
Third, unlike Justice White’s bank robber, many forfeiture defendants 
have commingled their allegedly ill-gotten gains with their other property.  
What makes modern criminal asset forfeiture so troubling is that defendants 
rarely have easily marked property that clearly does not belong to them.  
Defendants subject to forfeiture are generally not accused of theft, so it is 
unclear what property of theirs constitutes ill-gotten gains.  As was the case 
in Kaley, funds are often commingled with each other and used for large 
 
150 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 625 (1989). 
151 Id. at 618. 
152 See United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012). 
153 Id. 
154 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989). 
155 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 459 (1895). 
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purchases, such as cars or homes.156  This commingling makes all of the 
defendant’s property forfeitable, regardless of whether substantial portions 
of the property were purchased with untainted funds.  In contrast, Justice 
White’s bank robber may spend his savings or liquidate assets, which 
remain untainted. 
This third argument, in particular, speaks to the need for an 
adversarial, post-restraint, pretrial hearing where a defendant can contest 
her charges.  A hearing imposes little additional burden on prosecutors.  It 
should not be difficult to show probable cause that a defendant in 
possession of large amounts of cash in bank bags has robbed a bank—a 
bank robber will not likely escape the reach of a forfeiture statute because 
of this pretrial hearing. 
Fourth, Justice White’s analogy does not account for the fact that, 
generally, forfeitable assets are not returned to crime victims, let alone the 
victims of the particular crime allegedly committed by the defendant.157  
Justice White’s bank robber analogy assumes that the money taken from the 
robber goes right back into the bank vault—not to the Justice Department.  
In 2008, the Justice Department Fund had over $1 billion in debt-free assets 
available for law enforcement,158 making it clear that the vast amount of 
forfeiture funds are not returned to victims.  In fiscal year 2012, 
approximately 17% of the total funds the Justice Department seized through 
civil and criminal forfeiture were spent on victim compensation.159  At oral 
argument, the Government did not dispute Justice Stephen Breyer’s claim 
that even less goes to victims: roughly 5% to 10%.160 
 
156 See Kaley, 677 F.3d at 1318. 
157 Melinda Hardy, Comment, Sixth Amendment—Applicability of Right to Counsel of 
Choice to Forfeiture of Attorneys’ Fees, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1154, 1176 (1990) 
(“[I]n the case of forfeiture, however, no innocent victim will be denied his/her savings if a 
defendant uses tainted assets to pay the attorney.”). 
158 See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 33, at 6. 
159 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL 
REPORT 89 tbl.16 (2012), available at http://goo.gl/MfAcUS.  Approximately $426 million 
was seized in criminal forfeiture proceedings and almost $9 billion was seized in civil 
forfeiture proceedings.  By contrast, a total of approximately $1.5 billion was spent on 
victim compensation. 
160 Transcript of Oral Argument at 43–44, Kaley v. United States, No. 12-464 (argued 
Oct. 16, 2013).  
JUSTICE BREYER: [A] rough guess would be 5 or 10 percent goes to victims.  Now do you 
have a better estimate? 
MR. DREEBEN: I don’t, Justice Breyer.  I do know that one of the main purposes in seeking 
funds for forfeiture, particularly in white collar cases like this, is to pay restitution. 
Id. 
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Fifth and finally, Justice White’s analogy fails to take into account the 
specter that forfeiture laws put over criminal defendants.  Even before they 
become defendants, any attorneys they retain must be wary that their fees 
may become forfeitable in the future.161  This possibility works to prevent 
potential defendants from retaining counsel even before they are restrained 
from disposing of their assets, “strip[ping] the defendant of the right to 
retain counsel.”162 
Justice White analogizes the generic forfeiture defendant who wants to 
use forfeitable funds to pay for an attorney to a bank robber wishing to do 
the same.  For the above reasons, this analogy is inadequate.  It paints a 
picture of a defendant who has clearly committed a crime, carries in his 
possession the clear proceeds of that crime, and is apprehended by a law 
enforcement officer who will return those proceeds to their rightful owner.  
In many cases, none of this is true. 
The bank robber analogy is particularly damaging in the context of the 
pretrial, post-restraint hearing.  If this analogy were an apt description of the 
facts, the Kaley approach (which cited this example) begins to make sense.  
There is no need for a pretrial, post-restraint hearing if the court already 
knows that the defendant is guilty and is in possession of forfeitable funds.  
However, the flaws in Justice White’s bank robber analogy illustrate the 
importance of a pretrial proceeding. 
IV. NEW ARGUMENTS IN KALEY 
In Kaley, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the arguments made in the 
Supreme Court’s rulings in Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale.  However, 
the Eleventh Circuit also introduced new arguments in favor of less-
protective pretrial forfeiture procedures.  Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit 
made the argument that a pretrial hearing on the merits of the underlying 
grand jury determination impermissibly intrudes on the grand jury’s 
province.163  In addition, the Eleventh Circuit was cautious that the hearing 
might become a “second trial.164  Neither of these considerations adequately 
 
161 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 654 (1989) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting). 
162 Id. 
163 United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[T]his kind of pretrial 
challenge to the evidence supporting an indictment would be wholly inconsistent with the 
Supreme Court’s repeated pronouncements in Costello v. United States and its progeny.  In 
these cases, the Court has shown a profound reluctance to allow pretrial challenges to a 
grand jury’s probable cause determination.” (internal citation omitted)). 
164 Id. at 1327 (“[A] defendant whose assets have been restrained will ultimately receive 
a thorough hearing—the trial itself. . . .  The question is simply whether the Due Process 
Clause requires that the defendant get two such hearings.”). 
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addresses the plight of the forfeiture defendant whose assets have been 
frozen and who can no longer afford an attorney. 
A. THE SANCTITY OF THE GRAND JURY 
In deciding Kaley, the Eleventh Circuit was concerned that a pretrial 
hearing would contradict the grand jury’s indictment, running afoul of the 
Supreme Court’s “profound reluctance to allow pretrial challenges to a 
grand jury’s probable cause determination.”165  This is a key sticking point 
on the road to a full, adversarial, pretrial, and post-restraint hearing.  Such a 
hearing would require the prosecution to show with probable cause that an 
offense occurred and would therefore have the potential to reconsider the 
facts and law underlying the grand jury indictment.166 
Indeed, in Costello v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that 
a defendant has no right to, in effect, try his case prior to the trial: “An 
indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, . . . if 
valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits.  The 
Fifth Amendment requires nothing more.”167  The Eleventh Circuit 
thoroughly explained the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding the 
grand jury and the strictness with which the grand jury’s determinations are 
usually protected.168  At the end of its analysis, the court concluded, “a 
defendant cannot challenge whether there is a sufficient evidentiary 
foundation to support the grand jury’s probable cause determination.”169  
This result is problematic for a number of reasons. 
First, such a stance is not mandated by the Supreme Court’s grand jury 
jurisprudence.  None of the decisions referenced in the Eleventh Circuit’s 
decision relate to the application of a forfeiture statute.170  This context is 
important because of the novelty of criminal forfeiture actions.  In initiating 
forfeiture, prosecutors are seeking something “extra”171 beyond the 
traditional tools of imprisonment or fine—freezing assets before a 
determination of guilt or innocence.  Because freezing funds implicates the 
 
165 Id. at 1323. 
166 Id. 
167 Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956). 
168 Kaley, 677 F.3d at 1323–25. 
169 Id. at 1326. 
170 See generally United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36 (1992) (reversing the lower 
court’s dismissal of an indictment where the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory 
evidence to the grand jury); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (reversing a 
lower court’s application of the exclusionary rule to a grand jury proceeding); Lawn v. 
United States, 355 U.S. 339 (1958) (holding that defendants in a tax evasion case had no 
right to a preliminary hearing to question the grand jury’s indictment). 
171 Kaley, 677 F.3d at 1331 (Edmondson, J., concurring in the result). 
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defendant’s ability to mount a legal defense, it is of an entirely different 
character than pretrial detention.  When RICO was passed in 1970, it was 
the first criminal forfeiture law in the United States172—it would be odd for 
the device to fit neatly into existing criminal procedure law.  At oral 
argument in Kaley, even Chief Justice John Roberts was unsure that the 
“grand jury” argument was even relevant to this case.173  Because the 
procedure itself is new, it justifies new procedural protections.   
Second, it is important to note that pretrial restraining orders are 
discretionary—the statute does not require law enforcement officers to 
utilize forfeiture statutes.174  Because prosecutors maintain discretion to 
seek forfeiture, they are not “forced” to undergo pretrial hearings.  
Prosecutors can instead choose not to pursue forfeiture as a strategy.175 
Nor will the imposition of a full pretrial hearing dramatically burden 
prosecutors.  The “worst that will happen is that the pretrial restraint on 
property will not continue.”176  Therefore, the stakes for prosecutors are 
relatively low because of the opportunities for full criminal trials, regardless 
of the outcome of the pretrial hearings.177 
Next, the legal and financial burden to hold pretrial hearings would not 
be severe.  After all, the government would only be required to “establish 
probable cause a second time and in the presence of the defendant.”178  This 
would not be a high hurdle—the only difference in the procedure is that it 
would be adversarial, giving the defendant a chance to present her story.  
Any concern that such hearings will make a prosecutor’s job more difficult 
is somewhat circular.  If the charges cannot be proven with a substantially 
lowered burden of proof, perhaps trials are warranted before defendants are 
impoverished.  Moreover, applying the forfeiture device seems to be 
lucrative enough for law enforcement that the government will not 
discontinue its use, even if its costs increase.  After all, the activity 
produces revenue.179  As argued above, because the use of forfeiture is an 
incredibly helpful and new tool for law enforcement, it justifies new 
protections. 
 
172 Terrance G. Reed, American Forfeiture Law: Property Owners Meet the Prosecutor, 
CATO POLICY ANALYSIS, NO. 179, Sept. 29, 1992, available at http://goo.gl/W3912n.  
173 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Kaley v. United States, No. 12-464 (argued Oct. 
16, 2013) (quoting Chief Justice John Roberts as saying “I don’t see what this case, frankly, 
has to do with the grand jury at all, or review of the grand jury determination”). 
174 Kaley, 677 F.3d at 1330 (Edmondson, J., concurring in the result). 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 1331. 
177 Id. at 1331–32. 
178 Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d 1186, 1209 (2d Cir. 1991). 
179 See supra text accompanying notes 115–31. 
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Nor should the safety of witnesses and victims be overriding concerns 
in formulating the hearings.  The legislative history of the CFA indicated a 
concern that pretrial hearings would unnecessarily endanger witnesses 
testifying against criminals.180  The Kaley court found this legislative 
history persuasive.181  However, this reasoning ignores two possible 
solutions to the secrecy problem.  First, in camera hearings can be 
employed to protect witnesses.182  These proceedings would take place 
either in the judge’s chambers or in a secured, empty courtroom.183  This 
could prevent the public from gaining knowledge as to witnesses’ identities. 
Second and more importantly, the Federal Rules of Evidence would 
not apply in these pretrial hearings.184  Sidestepping the Rules of Evidence 
would allow the court to keep witnesses anonymous by allowing hearsay 
testimony.185  This is precisely the procedure the Monsanto court used on 
remand.186  These standards would be able to adequately protect the 
government’s interests in these hearings, even if they reconsider the 
probable cause determination made by the grand jury.  At oral argument in 
E-Gold, the Government could not articulate any harmful consequences 
from using this standard in the Second Circuit,187 illustrating that the only 
Government objection to the added procedure is that prosecutors would 
“prefer not to.”188  In oral argument at the Supreme Court in Kaley, the 
Government was evasive in articulating the impact of the Monsanto/E-Gold 
rule upon prosecutors in applicable circuits.189 
 
180 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 196 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3379. 
181 Kaley, 677 F.3d at 1328. 
182 United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 419 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
183 See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 828 (9th ed. 2009) (defining in camera). 
184 See 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(3) (2006 & Supp. 2009). 
185 Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d 1186, 1198 (2d Cir. 1991). 
186 Id. 
187 E-Gold, 521 F.3d at 419 n.1 (“We note that when asked directly at oral argument, the 
government could not identify any harm to its law enforcement efforts in the Second Circuit 
that has resulted from the Monsanto standard.”). 
188 HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTLEBY THE SCRIVENER: A STORY OF WALL STREET 12 (Simon 
& Schuster ed., 1997) (1853).  The Government’s argument is not that added procedure is 
impossible or impractical, just that it is not preferable to them.  See E-Gold, 521 F.3d at 419 
n.1.  This is an insufficient reason to compromise a litigant’s rights. 
189 Transcript of Oral Argument at 39–41, Kaley v. United States, No. 12-464 (argued 
Oct. 16, 2013). 
JUSTICE BREYER: In how many cases in those circuits has the government faced the serious 
risks that you’re talking about? 
MR. DREEBEN: We do face them.  I cannot quantify them -- 
JUSTICE BREYER: Can you give me a guess?  You are -- I mean, you make a huge point of 
how this will put the government at a disadvantage, so someone in your office, probably you, 
asked people in the Justice Department, do you have any examples?  Or how many cases have 
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Finally, it is important to note that the Kaley court may have oversold 
the “unique nature of the grand jury as an independent body, not an arm of 
the prosecution.”190  The court put much emphasis on the idea that the grand 
jury “serves the invaluable function in our society of standing between the 
accuser and the accused.”191  The Kaley court used this proposition to 
conclude that defendants are protected because the prosecution cannot 
restrain assets without a grand jury’s probable cause determination.192 
However, the court never examined the original proposition that grand 
juries shield the populace from overzealous prosecution.  Indeed, the idea 
that the grand jury is a “protective bulwark” is a long held, but ultimately 
unjustified, legal fiction.193  This proposition is protected by the rules of 
secrecy that prevent the public from knowing its workings.194  Since the 
early twentieth century, critics have referred to a grand jury as a “rubber 
stamp,” a “fifth wheel,” and a “total captive of the prosecutor.”195  This 
 
there been where serious problems arose?  And you probably got some kind of answer.  So you 
probably have some kind of idea. 
MR. DREEBEN: You’re correct, I did ask, and I received anecdotal responses. 
JUSTICE BREYER: How many anecdotes?  
(Laughter.) 
MR. DREEBEN: I received several specific anecdotes of instances in which the government 
elected not to proceed with a hearing. 
JUSTICE BREYER: In a number of cases, several specific.  Is that more like four or is it more 
like 24? 
MR. DREEBEN: There are group numbers in which offices reported, we have encountered this a 
number of times. 
Id.  The Government’s vagueness on this point should not be construed in its favor. 
190 United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2012).  The court also noted: 
It’s worth emphasizing that the prosecution cannot unilaterally restrain a defendant’s assets 
between the time of indictment and trial.  In the first place, a prosecutor may seek a pretrial 
restraint only because Congress has specifically authorized the government to proceed in this 
manner. . . .   And the restraining order will issue only if a lawfully constituted grand jury has 
found probable cause . . . . 
Id. at 1327. 
191 Id. at 1325 (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687 n.23 (1972)). 
192 Id. at 1327. 
193 Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 1, 1–3 (2004); see also David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial 
Accountability After Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility 
Measures Cannot Protect Against Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203, 226 
(2011), http://goo.gl/eZ9Cid.  See generally Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Grand Jury Innovation: 
Toward a Functional Makeover of the Ancient Bulwark of Liberty, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. 
J. 339 (2010) (arguing that the grand jury is an ineffective protection from arbitrary prosecution 
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194 Kuckes, supra note 193, at 2. 
195 Id. at 8 (collecting sources).  
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skepticism has become so widespread that the claim that a grand jury would 
“indict a ham sandwich” is now “cliché.”196  At oral argument in Kaley, 
even Chief Justice Roberts threw cold water on the Government’s claim 
that the grand jury protects Americans from unreasonable prosecution.197 
Of course, although we refer to “grand jury investigations” and 
“determinations,” the reality is quite different.198  It is, after all, the 
prosecutor who is in the driver’s seat.199  It is the prosecutor who chooses 
which witnesses to subpoena and controls the process.200  Evidence is often 
delivered to the prosecutor, who then displays it for the grand jury.201  
Ultimately, a “grand jury hears evidence only to the extent the prosecutor 
finds it helpful in building her case for trial.”202  The grand jury does not 
even have the power to ask direct questions of the court—its view is 
completely dictated by the prosecutor.203 
And, of course, the pressures put on prosecutors to seize assets must 
play a role in these proceedings.  Given that prosecutors are truly in control 
of a grand jury investigation, these bureaucratic pressures to increase 
forfeiture revenue may begin to skew the process of issuing indictments that 
restrain assets.204 
B. DOES THE DEFENDANT GET TWO TRIALS? 
The Kaley court also seemed wary of the concern that a criminal 
defendant might functionally get two trials if the court adopted an 
 
196 Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2335–36 
(2008); see also TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES 624 (Picador 2008) (1987) 
(quoting former Chief Judge Sol Wachtler from the New York Court of Appeals and 
immortalizing the expression). 
197 Transcript of Oral Argument at 25–26, Kaley v. United States, No. 12-464 (argued 
Oct. 16, 2013). 
MR. DREEBEN: The grand jury is set up as an independent body to protect the defendant from 
unfounded prosecutions.  It is structurally independent from the prosecution and the courts.  And 
it’s composed of -- 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I understand the theory.  In reality it’s not terribly -- it’s not great 
insulation from the overweaning [sic] power of the government. 
Id. 
198 See Michael B. Himmel & Matthew E. Power, Grand Jury Practice, 1994 N.J. LAW 
16, 16. 
199 See Washburn, supra note 196, at 2353. 
200 Id. 
201 Kuckes, supra note 193, at 26. 
202 Id. at 27. 
203 Id. at 31. 
204 See supra Part III.A. 
2014] IMPOSING INDIGENCE 191 
alternative approach.205  Indeed, the court made clear that adopting the 
Monsanto and E-Gold approach would “effectively require the district court 
to try the case twice.”206  Specifically, the court did not want to allow the 
Kaleys a pretrial hearing on the question of whether their actions 
constituted a crime.207 
However, the Monsanto approach does not truly allow the criminal 
defendant two trials.  As explained above, an adversarial, pretrial, post-
restraint hearing would not be a full trial.  There would be no jury, 
proceedings would be in camera, and hearsay evidence would be 
permissible—this “trial” would lack many of the hallmarks of the American 
justice system.  In addition, and perhaps more importantly, a forfeiture 
proceeding is something “extra” the government seeks.208  With this 
relatively novel practice, the government seeks not only to imprison the 
defendant and restrain assets post-trial, but it is also demanding that the 
defendant be adversely affected before a determination of guilt or 
innocence.209  This inverts the American presumption of innocence in 
criminal trials.  It is therefore only logical that some sort of procedure be 
deployed to protect forfeiture defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
In Monsanto210 and Caplin & Drysdale,211 the Supreme Court declined 
to strike down elements of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, which 
prevented defendants with frozen assets from hiring attorneys.  Specifically, 
these decisions firmly limited the qualified right to counsel guaranteed by 
the Sixth Amendment212 as well as the Fifth Amendment Due Process right 
to a balance of power between the government and the accused.213  
However, the Court still left room for lower courts to use some sort of 
pretrial, post-restraint hearing.  The development of such a process was left 
entirely to the lower courts.214 
In the intervening years, two chief approaches have developed.  The 
first approach, established by the Second Circuit in Monsanto IV, allows a 
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full adversarial hearing on both the question of whether the assets listed in 
the grand jury indictment are rightly forfeitable215 and whether there is 
probable cause that a crime took place.216  The Second Circuit therefore 
created procedures to protect forfeiture defendants without simply ruling 
the CFA unconstitutional.217  The D.C. Circuit in E-Gold adopted the 
Monsanto approach to pretrial, post-restraint hearings,218 finding little 
evidence that the Monsanto approach had unduly hampered prosecutorial 
flexibility in the sixteen years since Monsanto.219  In 2012, however, the 
Eleventh Circuit followed the Tenth Circuit220 and held in United States v. 
Kaley that a pretrial, post-restraint hearing cannot include a questioning of 
the grand jury’s probable cause determination that a crime occurred.221 
The second approach used in Kaley and Jones before it fails to 
recognize the vast impact that forfeiture laws can have on defendants who 
have not yet been proven guilty.  Because law enforcement officers and 
prosecutors have a profit motive to pursue forfeiture crimes, forfeiture 
defendants are more likely to be adversely impacted, regardless of whether 
they are guilty.  Both decisions subscribe to the fundamental, circular logic 
that indicted defendants are presumed guilty of the crimes for which they 
have been indicted.222 
To a certain extent the criticisms of this Comment apply broadly to 
Monsanto III and Caplin & Drysdale.  In both of these decisions, the Court 
held that the Government can prevent a defendant from hiring counsel by 
restraining their assets.  Both of these decisions created serious 
complications for the criminal defense bar and have restrained criminal 
defendants from seeking counsel.  Both decisions have created conditions 
that “allow[] the government to impose indigence and deprive RICO and 
CCE defendants of the opportunity to retain private counsel merely by 
obtaining an indictment.”223  Candidly, this author would favor overturning 
Caplin & Drysdale.  However, at oral argument in Kaley, Justice Antonin 
Scalia seemed to be the only Justice on the Court interested in this 
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approach.224  Therefore, it would seem that a more conservative solution is 
the most realistic. 
Additionally, it is necessary to recognize the value of some sort of 
forfeiture provision.  After all, Justice White’s bank robber should probably 
not be permitted to use his ill-gotten gains to hire a legal team.  It was 
Congress’s intention to “lessen the economic power of organized crime and 
drug enterprises,”225 and that is certainly a worthy objective.  The Monsanto 
IV approach still allows the government to freeze forfeitable funds and 
prevent them from being used for attorney’s fees: it does not allow the bank 
robber to keep his ill-gotten gains.  Monsanto IV creates a meaningful 
opportunity for defendants to be heard before their trials—the right to 
question the merits of their indictments at trial without their counsel of 
choice is simply not helpful.  A pretrial, post-restraint hearing helps 
neutralize the “substantial risk of an erroneous deprivation of a defendant’s 
significant property interest in the absence of an opportunity to be heard.”226 
As illustrated in the discussion above, the real trouble with forfeiture 
statutes is in discerning the kingpins of ongoing criminal enterprises from 
defendants who might actually be innocent.  The Monsanto IV approach 
provides a middle ground that can help the courts distinguish Michael 
Corleones227 from Kerri Kaleys.  It also does so without imposing undue 
burdens on prosecutors.  Forfeiture statues are permissive—prosecutors are 
not required to utilize them—so if prosecutors wish not to go through the 
process of pretrial hearings, they need only decline the opportunity to freeze 
assets.  If they choose to utilize the asset forfeiture device, the pretrial 
hearings will require only a probable cause standard and will implement 
safeguards to prevent others from divulging information that the 
prosecutors wish to leave for trial. 
 
224 Transcript of Oral Argument at 14–15, Kaley v. United States, No. 12-464 (argued 
Oct. 16, 2013). 
JUSTICE SCALIA: To tell you the truth, I would prefer -- to save your client, I would prefer a 
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These hearings are not “mini-trials” for the defendants to get second 
bites at the apple.  If a defendant is successful in the pretrial hearing, she 
merely receives control of her assets—the full trial still looms.  When the 
Supreme Court decides Kaley, it should heed the words of Judge J.L. 
Edmondson, concurring in the judgment in Kaley: 
The Constitution’s Bill of Rights, including the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, was 
intended by the Framers to protect citizens from the high power of the federal 
government.  The Constitution is to guarantee each citizen a fair deal when the federal 
government takes aim at him.  More specifically about property, we ought to bear in 
mind this fact: “Liberty, property, and no stamps!  It had been the first slogan of the 
American Revolution.” . . . For the Federal Executive, in effect, to seize a citizen’s 
property; to deprive him thereby of the best means to defend himself in a criminal 
case; and then, by means of the criminal case, to take his liberty strikes me as a set of 
circumstances about which our nation’s history and its Constitution demands that the 
process at each step be fully fair.228 
Forfeiture has become a formidable and important tool in the 
prosecution of criminals.  However, the prosecution’s interest in using this 
tool must be balanced against the defendant’s interest in due process and 
against the greatly increased probability of wrongful prosecution.  As such, 
the analysis regarding the interests at stake must not rest on the initial 
assumption that the defendant is analogous to a bank robber caught red-
handed with bags of the bank’s money.  The Supreme Court and Eleventh 
Circuit’s starting point therefore flies in the face of the fundamental axiom 
of American criminal law: criminal defendants are innocent until proven 
guilty. 
The ongoing Megaupload criminal case displays the flaws in this 
logic.  Prosecutors chose to bring a criminal case based on a novel theory of 
criminal copyright infringement—that secondary infringement gives rise to 
criminal liability.229  Without an adversarial pretrial procedure on the merits 
of the indictment, Megaupload’s assets will remain frozen, leaving it unable 
to adequately defend itself in an extremely complex and expensive case.230  
Where criminal forfeiture was originally used against organized criminals 
accused of drug offenses and racketeering, it is now used to push novel and 
complex criminal legal theories while depriving defendants the opportunity 
to defend themselves. 
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